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We show that monogamy of Bell’s inequality violations, which is strictly weaker condition than
no-signaling is enough to prove security of quantum key distribution. We derive our results for a
whole class of monogamy constraints and generalize our results to any theory that communicating
parties may have access to. Some of these theories do not respect no-signaling principle yet still
allow for secure communication. This proves that no-signaling is only a sufficient condition for
the possibility of secure communication, but not the necessary one. We also present some new
qualitative results concerning the security of existing quantum key distribution protocols.
1 Quantum cryptography [1], or more precisely Quan-
tum Key Distribution (QKD) is the first application of
quantum information theory that has entered the com-
mercial market. It’s success stems from the fact that
the safety of the key distribution protocol is based only
on the laws of quantum mechanics, contrary to classical
public key protocols which are secure only if certain task
is complex enough for eavesdropper to perform. Though
the laws of quantum mechanics have never been demon-
strated to give incorrect predictions, physicists are con-
stantly searching for more general theories, that could in
principle counter these laws. In such theories quantum
cryptography would no longer be secure unless the ex-
act properties of quantum mechanics that warrant that
security are also present in ”post-quantum” world. One
good candidate for such property is no-signaling princi-
ple. Since it appears not only in quantum mechanics but
also in special relativity it is likely that in the future uni-
fication of these theories it will also hold. Indeed, it has
been shown that no-signaling principle is sufficient for
the safety of quantum key distribution [2]. That result
significantly strengthens the QKD since, though it uses
only the resources available in quantum theory it is safe
in a whole family of theories that include but are not
limited to quantum mechanics. In this paper we address
the question, whether it is possible to find even weaker
principle, which would lead to defining even larger group
of theories for which quantum protocols remain secure.
We show that the monogamy of Bell’s inequality viola-
tions, which is strictly weaker condition than no-signaling
is enough to prove the security of quantum key distribu-
tion. Therefore, for the first time, we are able to prove
that quantum protocols are safe even if the eavesdropper
has access to the resources of some signaling theories.
Monogamy relations - Let us define β(X ,Y) to be the
left hand side of CHSH [3] inequality defined for parties
X and Y
β(X ,Y) = 1
4
∑
x,y
P (X ⊕ Y = xy|x, y) ≤ 3
4
(1)
where X,Y ∈ {0, 1} are the outcomes and x, y ∈
{0, 1} are the settings of parties X and Y respectively.
Throughout the whole paper we adopt notation in, which
parties are denoted by ”mathcal” letters, their settings
by lowercase italic and outcomes by uppercase italic let-
ters. One way to understand (1) is to consider a game
where two separated parties are being given by referees
randomly chosen numbers - the settings x, y. Their goal
is to return the outcomes X,Y that with probability as
high as possible satisfy X ⊕ Y = xy. CHSH inequality
states that there is no classical procedure that would al-
low them to have the success probability greater than 34 .
On the other hand with quantum resources it is possible
to have this probability as high as Tsirelson bound [4]:
1
2
(
1+ 1√
2
)
. This particular approach to CHSH inequality
stresses the fact that the outcome of each of the parties
can be the output of any procedure used by that party, as
long as it does not violate any of the assumptions of the
CHSH game. This will become very useful in the proof
of our main result.
It has been shown [5] (see also [6]) that in any no-
signaling theory, the following inequality must be satis-
fied
β(A,B) + β(A, E) ≤ 3
2
(2)
We will refer to it as NS-monogamy. It is is weaker than
no-signaling principle since NS-monogamy holds in any
NS theory and the converse is not true. To see this let
us imagine a theory which allows any three-partite of the
form
P (A,B,E|a, b, e)
= pPq1(A,B,E|a, b, e) + (1− p)Pq2(A,E,B|a, e, b) (3)
where p ∈ [0, 1] and
Pq(X,Y, Z|x, y, z) = 1
2
Pq(X,Y |x, y) (4)
Pq(X,Y |x, y) =
(
1
2
+ (−1)Y q
)
(X ⊕ Y ⊕ xy ⊕ 1) (5)
Probability distribution Pq(X,Y |x, y) is a version of PR-
box introduced in [7] with an additional parameter q ∈
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which describes the bias in the local probabilities.
The original PR-box has q = 0 and it is the only value
of this parameter for which Pq(X,Y |x, y) is no-signaling.
So Pq(X,Y, Z|x, y, z) is a probability distribution that
allows for maximal algebraic violation of (1) between X
and Y, while Z has uncorrelated white noise. The com-
plete three-partite distribution P (A,B,E|a, b, e) may be
then understood as supplying, with probability p, parties
A and B with a biased PR-box and with probability 1−p
the parties A and E. It is easy to check that this proba-
bility distribution is signaling for almost all combinations
of p, q1 and q2 while satisfying (2).
Quantum mechanics satisfies not only (2) but also a
stronger relation(
β(A, E)− 1
2
)2
+
(
β(A,B)− 1
2
)2
≤ 1
8
(6)
which has been proven in [8]. We will refer to it as QM-
monogamy. The difference between (6) and the form
given in [8] follows from the fact that here we use CHSH
inequality written in the terms of probabilities, while in
[8] it is written in the terms of correlation functions.
In order to be able to make more general statements we
will express these (and any other) monogamy relations in
a more homogenous form
β(A, E) ≤ fMT (β(A,B)) (7)
where fMT is the function that describes the monogamy
of the theory T . fMT :
[
1
2 , 1
] → [0, 1] can be any non-
increasing function. The domain of the function is cho-
sen to be
[
1
2 , 1
]
since the form of CHSH inequality (1)
has algebraic bound equal to 1 and the value of 12 corre-
sponds to probability distribution describing white noise.
We do not have to consider the behavior of fMT below
1
2
since every monogamy relation should also has the prop-
erty that fMT (β(A,B)) = fMT (1−β(A,B)) because if Bob
always flips his outcome the value of β(A,B) changes to
β′(A,B) = 1 − β(A,B). This cannot have any influence
on β(A, E). Therefore we can limit ourselves to the study
of the monogamy for β(A,B) ≥ 12 . The above examples
expressed in this way become
β(A, E) ≤ fMNS(β(A,B)) =
3
2
− β(A,B)(8)
β(A, E) ≤ fMQM (β(A,B)) =
√
1
8
−
(
β(A,B)− 1
2
)2
+
1
2
(9)
Now we are ready to present our main result, which
states that (8) is sufficient condition for the security of
quantum key distribution protocols against individual at-
tacks.
Main result - We will consider the following QKD pro-
tocol used by Alice and Bob: They share a large number
of copies of a state, which they hope is close to singlet.
For each copy they randomly choose one of the measure-
ments that are optimal for the violation of CHSH in-
equality and write down the outcomes. Later they choose
randomly a part of the runs and announce all the data
corresponding to them to estimate β(A,B). In the rest
of the cases only Alice announces her choice of the ba-
sis. Her outcome is going to be the key. This is exactly
the CHSH protocol, which security against individual at-
tacks in no-signaling theories has been shown in [9]. It
has been proven [10] that Alice and Bob will be able to
establish secure communication if
I(A : B) > I(A : E). (10)
Since we are interested only in individual attacks and
outcome of Alice is binary, the above condition simplifies
to
PB > PE (11)
where PB and PE are probabilities that Bob and Eve
respectively guess the bit of Alice after the announcement
of her choice of measurement basis. We will now show
that if Eve is in the possession of a procedure that gives
her high PE , she could use the same procedure to play
the CHSH game better than NS-monogamy allows.
Since the outcome of Alice A equals A = B ⊕ ab with
the probability β(A,B), Bob, who knows a, b and B can
guess that A = B ⊕ ab and be right with the probability
PB = β(A,B). (12)
Now, let us assume that Eve has a procedure that takes
as an input the setting a of Alice and generates G as an
output. The performance of this procedure is defined
by the set of four probabilities Pij which describe the
probability that G equals the outcome of Alice if her
setting was j and Eve inputs i to her procedure. For the
reasons that will soon become clear we have to consider
also the cases in which Eve inputs a value different than
the setting of Alice, but when Eve is eavesdropping that
will never happen. Her success probability is then
PE =
P00 + P11
2
≤ max{P00, P11}. (13)
We will consider two possible cases. First: P00 ≥ P11
and PE ≤ P00. Let us see what value of β(A, E) can
Eve achieve with a strategy that involves the use of her
procedure. Since in the CHSH game she does not know
the setting of Alice, she will always input 0 to her pro-
cedure. If she returns as her outcome E = G then the
probabilities that appear in CHSH are equal
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 0, e = 0) = P00
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 1, e = 0) = P01
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 0, e = 1) = P00
P (A⊕ E = 1|a = 1, e = 1) = 1− P01 (14)
3That leads to
β(A, E) = 1
2
P00 +
1
4
≥ 1
2
PE +
1
4
(15)
In the second case: P00 < P11 and PE < P11. Now
Eve adapts a different strategy. She will always input 1
and return E = G⊕ e as her outcome. The probabilities
that appear in CHSH are now
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 0, e = 0) = P10
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 1, e = 0) = P11
P (A⊕ E = 0|a = 0, e = 1) = 1− P10
P (A⊕ E = 1|a = 1, e = 1) = P11 (16)
That leads to
β(A, E) = 1
2
P11 +
1
4
>
1
2
PE +
1
4
(17)
Therefore, for both cases, we have
1
2
PE +
1
4
≤ β(A, E) (18)
We now use NS-monogamy (8) and (12) to get
1
2
PE +
1
4
≤ fMNS(PB) (19)
If we write fMNS in the explicit form f
M
NS(PB) =
3
2 − PB ,
we get our main result that (19) implies (11) as long
as PB = βNS(A,B) > 56 . It is worth noticing that 56
is less than the Tsirelson bound, so the correlations be-
tween A and B required for the security based only on
monogamy are within reach of quantum mechanics. This
result is similar to the conditions for security based on
no-signaling derived in [9] (see also [11] for the conditions
for CHSH protocol with pre-processing).
Note that (19) holds in every theory that has NS-
monogamy. This theory can even be signaling like the
example (3). This proves that no-signaling is only a suf-
ficient condition for the existence of secure cryptography,
not a necessary one.
Generalization to other monogamies - Note that the
derivation of our main result does not depend on the ex-
plicit form of fMNS , which is only used later to establish
the minimal value of β(A,B) required for security. Since
nowhere in the paper we assume no-signaling, we do not
have to limit ourselves to the monogamy constraint de-
rived from that principle. If instead of NS-monogamy
(8) we would assume QM-monogamy (9) (which can also
hold in signaling theories), instead of (19) we would get
1
2
PE +
1
4
≤ fMQM (PB), (20)
which leads to weaker requirement: βQM (A,B) > 12 +
1√
10
.
In general, for any theory T which has T-monogamy
defined by (7) the following condition holds
1
2
PE +
1
4
≤ fMT (PB) (21)
It will be possible to construct a safe cryptographic pro-
tocol for Alice and Bob who have access only to quantum
resources as long as the highest value of PB achievable by
quantum mechanics causes (21) to bound PE to values
lower than PB . Rewriting (18) as
PE ≤ 2β(A, E)− 1
2
(22)
and keeping in mind that PB = β(A,B) we find that the
condition (11) will be satisfied if the T-monogamy can
imply
β(A,B) > 2β(A, E)− 1
2
(23)
or in other words
fMT
(
β(A,B)
)
<
1
2
β(A,B) + 1
4
(24)
Which, if Alice and Bob are able to reach the Tsirelson
bound, becomes
fMT
(
1
2
(
1 +
1√
2
))
<
1
2
(
1 +
1
2
√
2
)
(25)
Inequality (24) is the sufficient condition on T-monogamy
to be able to warrant the safety of quantum key distri-
bution protocol.
For example, let us consider a 1.1-monogamy which is
weaker than that of any no-signaling theory. It is defined
by
fM1.1(β) =
1
2
((
1− (2β − 1)1.1) 11.1 + 1) (26)
The critical value of β(A,B) for theory with 1.1-
monogamy is 0.8530 which, though quite high, is still
0.07% lower than Tsirelson bound.
All three discussed monogamies along with the suffi-
cient condition (24) are presented in fig. 1.
Our result can be easily generalized to the the case
where Alice and Bob have access to the resources of the-
ory T, while the eavesdropper has access to the resources
of T’. If T allows for βT (A,B) and T’ has T’-monogamy
then (25) becomes
fMT ′
(
βT (A,B)
)
<
1
2
βT (A,B) + 1
4
(27)
Discussion - In the proofs of security that are based ei-
ther on laws of quantum mechanics or no-signaling princi-
ple there appears a critical value of β(A,B). If Alice and
Bob estimate their correlations to be below that value
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0.6
0.7
0.8
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Sufficient condition
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FIG. 1: Monogamy relations for different theories are plotted.
The sufficient condition for the security of the key distribu-
tion protocol (24) is described by the line that passes through
P =
(
1
2
(
1 + 1√
2
)
, 1
2
(
1 + 1
2
√
2
))
. The intersection of this line
with monogamy relation for any specific theory T gives the
critical value of βT (A,B) above which Alice and Bob can have
secure communication. More explicitly, if A and B estimate
their β(A,B) to be greater than βT (A,B), they can have se-
cure communication against individual attacks of the eaves-
dropper who has access to the resources of theory T. Point P
has its horizontal coordinate equal to the Tsirelson bound, so
for any theory T that intersects the sufficient condition line
before P , it is possible forA and B to have a quantum protocol
secure against attacks from T regime. Note that intersection
of 1.1-monogamy with sufficient condition line is slightly be-
fore P . Therefore, quantum mechanics allows QKD secure
against attacks by eavesdroppers from all three theories.
they cannot assume security. If they are above, then
they are secure and the actual value of βcrit(A,B) im-
plies only the key rate. On the other hand, if we assume
only monogamy than the higher β(A,B) the larger the
number of theories in which A and B are secure. That
is an interesting corollary as it shows that cryptographic
systems that use Bell inequalities to warrant the security
not only get higher key rates as the violation of Bell’s in-
equality raises but also gain more qualitative security as
the number of theories against attacks from which they
are protected raises too.
We have shown that it is possible to base the security
of quantum key distribution only on monogamy relations
for violations of Bell’s inequality. That is significantly
weaker assumption than the best previously known - no-
signaling principle. Moreover, our proof does not depend
on the specific type of the monogamy relation, but on
its value at a single point: fMT
(
1
2
(
1 + 1√
2
))
. We have
also generalized our results to give predictions for any
theory that the communicating parties may have access
to. We have proved that no-signaling is only a sufficient
condition for the existence of secure cryptography, not a
necessary one.
In the case of security based on no-signaling, the proofs
went a long way from partial version presented in [2] to
universally-composable [12] shown in [13]. We express
hope that our paper will begin the similar path for secu-
rity based on monogamy, which would strengthen quan-
tum cryptography even further. We also conjecture that
it is possible to prove universally-composable security
based solely on monogamy.
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